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The Effect of Early Retirement Incentives on
the Training Participation of Older Workers
Didier Fouarge — Trudie Schils
Abstract. Human capital theory predicts that older workers are less likely to
participate in on-the-job training than younger workers, due to lower net returns
on such investments. Early retirement institutions are likely to affect these returns.
Using the European Community Household Panel we show that older workers
participate less in training, and that early retirement institutions do indeed matter.
Generous early retirement schemes discourage older workers from taking part in
training, whereas ﬂexible early retirement schemes encourage this. Finally, the
results suggest that in most European countries training can keep older workers
longer in the labour market.
1. Introduction
Improving the labour market opportunities of older workers and
increasing their participation rate is high on the policy agenda of
most European countries. The average labour market participation
rate of workers aged 55 or more is below 50 per cent in the Euro-
pean Union (Eurostat, 2007). Only in a few countries, among which
the Scandinavian ones, are the participation rates of older workers
signiﬁcantly higher. The policy measures taken so far to keep older
workers in the labour market are focused on the so-called ‘pull
factors of early retirement’, such as reducing the ﬁnancial incentives
for early retirement or increasing the ofﬁcial retirement age
(Blondal and Scarpetta, 1999; Gruber and Wise, 2002). More
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2DQ, UK and 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA.recently, however, policy attention has shifted towards the ‘push
factors of early retirement’, such as age discrimination in employ-
ers’ hiring decisions, and the lower productivity and employability
of older workers. In this respect, increasing the investments in
human capital of older workers, in particular through participation
in on-the-job training activities, is a frequently mentioned instru-
ment for improving their labour market opportunities and to delay
early retirement. However, the average participation rate in on-the-
job training of workers aged 55 and over is below 8 per cent in the
European Union (Eurostat, 2007).
The aim of this paper is to investigate the training differential
between younger and older workers (55 and older), and to explain
the observed disparities across European countries in the light of
differencesinearlyretirementinstitutions.Thereisalackofevidence
on this subject as in the few studies on age differences in training
participation, the samples are restricted to workers under the age of
54(Arulampalametal.,2004;Bassaninietal.,2005).Humancapital
theory predicts that investments in human capital are a way to
increase productivity and thereby to enhance job, employment, and
income security. Previous empirical studies showed that participa-
tion in on-the-job training compensates for the depreciation of
human capital and increases the employability of workers (Bishop,
1997; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000). Other studies have
documented the positive effects of on-the-job training on wages and
job security (Pischke, 2001; Zweimuller and Winter-Ebmer, 2000).
However, human capital theory also predicts that human capital
investments are lower for older workers compared with younger
workers. This is because the period to recuperate the costs of such
investments is shorter, and because of the depreciation of human
capital that lowers the returns to training (Ben-Porath, 1967;
Neumann and Weiss, 1995). Additionally, institutions favouring
earlyretirementshortenthepaybackperiodofhumancapitalinvest-
ments, in particular that of older workers (Lau and Poutvaara,
2006). Such institutions make it less attractive to invest in training
from both the employer’s and the worker’s perspective. Using lon-
gitudinal data covering a range of European countries, this paper
tests the relationship between early retirement institutions and the
training participation of older workers. The results indicate that the
training participation of older workers is lower in countries with
generous early retirement systems. Finally, the paper provides some
evidence suggesting that increased participation in on-the-job train-
ing of older workers can prolong their working lives.
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economic contributions on the relationship between age and human
capital investments, and on how this relationship is affected by
country-speciﬁc differences in early retirement systems. Section 3
then gives a description of the data and explains our estimation
strategy. Section 4 provides some descriptive statistics, discusses
the estimation results for the participation in training, and presents
some evidence on the effect on the retirement decision. The paper
ends with concluding remarks.
2. Training of older workers: theoretical background
The top panel of Figure 1 suggests that there is a positive corre-
lation between the labour market participation rate and training
participation rate of older workers in Europe.
1 There are, however,
signiﬁcant country differences. The position of the Northern Euro-
pean countries and the UK is of particular interest. In these
countries, above-average training rates are associated with above-
average participation rates among older workers. The high training
incidence could be explained by the well-established tradition of
lifelong learning in those countries (OECD, 2005). The bottom
panel of Figure 1 depicts the ratio of the training participation rate
and the labour market participation rate of the age group 55–64 to
the age group 25–54. In this way, a correction is applied for the
general labour or training participation of the population in a given
country. The lower the differential, the larger the gap between the
younger and older workers. Again, the association between labour
participation and training incidence is positive. Smaller differences
in training participation between younger and older workers
coincide with smaller differences in the employment rate. This, of
course, does not say anything about the causal relationship between
the two variables. What does theory tell us about on-the-job train-
ing at older ages?
2.1 Older workers and human capital investments
The leading perspective on on-the-job training is the human
capital theory as developed by Becker (1962) and further reﬁned by
others in the 1970s and 1980s (for an overview see Leuven, 2005).
According to human capital theory, investments in human capital
can be seen as the formation of knowledge- or skill-based capital
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informal knowledge obtained through pre-school learning, educa-
tion, and job-related learning. The latter comprises both formal
training (formally organized activities such as apprenticeships,
workshops, and courses) and informal training (learning-by-doing
or work experience). Whereas Mincer (1962) includes both types
of training in his on-the-job training concept, and Arrow (1962)
stresses the importance of leaning-by-doing, the focus in this paper
is on formal on-the-job training.
Human capital theory predicts that the probability of participa-
ting in on-the-job training programmes is lower for older workers,
because net returns to training are lower for them than for younger
workers. At least four reasons can be given for this. First, net
Figure 1. Training and labour market participation in Europe in 2006,
by age and country
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Source: Author’s calculation based on online Eurostat Statistical Database.
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for older workers (Becker, 1962). This reduces the effectiveness of
training investments for older workers in comparison with younger
workers. As we explain later in this section, the existence of early
retirement opportunities reduces the expected payback period of
human capital investments even further, discouraging both older
workers and employers from investing in training. Second, because
‘learning begets learning’, training investments at an early age are
more efﬁcient than training at a later age (Becker, 1962; Heckman,
2000). Third, the returns to training are lower at later ages because
of human capital depreciation (Neumann and Weiss, 1995). For
older workers, such human capital depreciation is caused by both
technical and economic skills obsolescence. The ﬁrst refers to skills
obsolescence due to atrophy or wear caused by the natural aging
process. The second refers to the skills obsolescence due to changes
in the need of skills in the job, e.g. due to technological development
or sectoral shifts in the economy (de Grip and van Loo, 2002).
Fourth, it is often presumed that older workers are less trainable
than younger workers because their learning ability and their ﬂexi-
bility are considered to be lower (Casey and Bruche, 1981). This is
expected to increase the costs and efforts associated with the train-
ing activities for older workers.
Theory further suggests that, apart from age, a worker’s human
capital endowments are expected to affect his or her training prob-
ability (e.g. Griliches, 1997). Two contradictory perspectives can
be distinguished. The accumulation perspective predicts a positive
association between a worker’s human capital and his or her par-
ticipation in training. It is argued that especially people with higher
human capital endowments are more likely to accumulate skills and
knowledge during their working career compared with people with
lower human capital levels. This means that formal education and
training are complementary. However, the compensation perspec-
tive of lifelong learning holds that it is especially workers with the
lowest human capital endowments who need to be trained to make
up for their lack of skills and knowledge. Evidence to date supports
the accumulation perspective (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998;
Riphahn and Trübswetter, 2008). Concerning the effect of educa-
tional level across age groups two competing predictions can be
made. On the one hand, schooling systems have improved over time
and older workers have received their formal education a longer
time ago, implying that their knowledge is worth less compared
with that of younger workers in the current period (cf. Neumann
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formal education and the current time period implies a higher
depreciation of the knowledge gained from formal education for
older workers. This suggests that the effect of former education on
the likelihood of participating in training is higher for younger
workers. On the other hand, older workers generally have acquired
more work experience, thereby raising or updating their human
capital. More work experience indicates that the worker has been
involved in informal on-the-job learning process, and most prob-
ably in formal learning activities as well. Henceforth, it is not
known beforehand whether or not the training propensity across
educational levels is different across age groups.
2.2 Training participation and retirement institutions
With respect to investments in human capital, human capital
theory distinguishes four phases within an individual’s life cycle
(Blinder and Weiss, 1976). Phase I is characterized by investments
in human capital without employment (a period of formal educa-
tion). Phase II starts with the working career of the individual and
is characterized by both employment and investments in human
capital. Phase III comprises employment without investments in
human capital, i.e. the person reaps the beneﬁts of the investments
made in the earlier phases. Finally, in phase IV, the individual
retires, i.e. he or she is no longer employed nor does he or she invest
in human capital. Human capital theory further predicts that this
life cycle of human capital investments is associated with a back-
loading earning proﬁle. Workers earn less than their marginal pro-
ductivity in their early working career (phase II), but more in their
late career (phase III) (Blinder and Weiss, 1976). This means that
there is a wage–productivity gap for workers of older age. A recent
study on Canadian data has indeed provided evidence for this
wage–productivity gap (Dostie, 2006). This can prevent further
wage increases and is an incentive for employers to stimulate early
retirement of their older workers. Nevertheless, for the employer,
on-the-job training of older workers can increase their productivity
relative to their wage and make older workers more attractive to
keep. This improves the older worker’s position at work and their
employability, which might in turn increase their job satisfaction
and the utility of work. Accordingly, there are reasons to believe
that on-the-job training can delay the retirement decision.
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differences in training incidence through their effect on retirement.
2
Institutions favouring early retirement shorten the payback period
of human capital investments. Or in terms of the lifecycle model of
human capital investments, early retirement institutions affect the
start of phase IV, and thereby also the turning point between phases
II and III. It can be predicted that highly generous early retirement
schemes (ﬁnancially attractive schemes that offer high replacement
rates) increase the early retirement probability. Henceforth, in
countries with generous early retirement schemes the probability to
participate in training activities at older ages is lower, and this
reduces the effectiveness of training as a strategy to postpone retire-
ment (Lau and Poutvaara, 2006). Apart from the generosity of the
early retirement schemes the ﬂexibility of these schemes is of impor-
tance. Flexibility refers to the ‘freedom of choice’ the individual has
in deciding upon the timing of retirement, or how easy or difﬁcult
it is to meet the entitlement conditions of the early retirement
schemes. For example, in a perfectly ﬂexible retirement scheme, the
individual can decide any time whether or not to retire, without any
restrictions. In other words, the individual has a large opportunity
set in terms of early retirement dates. Therefore, in a ﬂexible early
retirement scheme, the individual does not necessarily have to take
up the ﬁrst early retirement opportunity that is offered to him or
her. In such ﬂexible schemes, there are more incentives to take up
training. When the opportunity set is smaller, due to restrictions,
the individual is more likely to take up the ﬁrst opportunity that is
available, as he or she is uncertain when the next opportunity to
retire arrives. Consequently, it can be predicted that there is a
positive relation between the level of ﬂexibility of the early retire-
ment schemes and the probability to engage in training at later age.
Using information on the generosity and ﬂexibility of early retire-
ment routes in Europe, Schils (2005) has developed a characteriza-
tion of early retirement systems in Europe. This characterization
is based on public early retirement schemes, but also includes
occupational and private pension schemes. Moreover, the index
accounts for alternative pathways to retirement such as unemploy-
ment and disability schemes. The general ﬁndings are that countries
in the liberal tradition (e.g. Ireland, the UK) have early retirement
routes that are neither ﬂexible nor generous; Northern European
countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Sweden) have schemes that are
ﬂexible but only moderately generous; countries in the Bismarckian
tradition (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, but also Italy and the
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ible. Details on the calculation of the index are provided in the next
section.
3. Data and approach
3.1 Data
Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), we
constructed a panel data set (i.e. repeated measurements over time
among the same sample of individuals) containing information for
13 European countries for the period 1994–2001.
3 The data are
organized as a pooled person-year ﬁle, with one record for each
person at each point of interview. For the analysis, we only retained
people of working age, aged 25–64. Our data set includes some
70–90 thousand respondents per wave across 13 countries.
The employment status is deﬁned using the self-reported activity
status of individuals. People in paid employment, paid apprentice-
ship, or following special training schemes are deﬁned as being
employed. The self-employed and full-time students are removed
from the data. People with small jobs of less than 15 hours per week
are considered as inactive. Training is measured using the following
question: ‘Have you at any time since January (in the previous year)
been engaged in vocational education or training, including any
part-time or short courses?’
4 This means that informal on-the-job
training is not included, and as no other information on this subject
is available, we include current job tenure to account for this. The
majority of formal on-the-job training is vocational; only about 14
per cent is general training. This means that the question captures
ﬁrm-speciﬁc training investments. Information on the duration of
the training spell is not available. However, evidence suggests that it
is more the incidence of a training spell than its duration that is
relevant (Pischke, 2001).
Table 1 shows the information used for the evaluation of the
generosity and ﬂexibility of the countries’ early retirement schemes
[for a full discussion, see Schils (2005, pp. 100–106)]. Account is
taken of all three pillars of a country’s pension system. The ﬁrst
pillar refers to publicly managed pension schemes, the second to
occupationally managed schemes (e.g. unions or occupational
pension funds), and the third to privately managed schemes. To
determine the generosity of early retirement systems, the countries
are scored according to two different indicators. The generosity of
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on continued employment. The generosity of the schemes within the
second and third pillar as well as those enclosed in the disability and
unemployment schemes is evaluated using replacement rates. The
system’s ﬂexibility is evaluated using the strictness of entitlement to
early retirement schemes. For example, the highest level of ﬂexi-
bility in this respect is found in schemes that only require a mini-
mum age, or a minimum contribution period. Such entitlement
conditions are quite easy to meet. For early retirement schemes
within the second or third pillar, these entitlement conditions are
difﬁcult to assess because of the large variety of schemes. The assets
Table 1. Flexibility and generosity scores assigned to early retirement
pathways
Flexibility of early retirement schemes
First pillar: Entitlement conditions
pension schemea
Second and third pillar: Assets
as a percentage of GDPb Score
Only a minimum wage or a minimum
contribution period
More than 80% 1.5
Both a minimum wage and a minimum
contribution period or a redundancy
condition
Between 50% and 80% 1.0
Between 10% and 50% 0.5
No ﬁrst pillar early retirement option Less than 10% 0
Generosity of early retirement schemes
First pillar: Implicit tax on continued
employmentc
Second and third pillar:
Replacement rates Score
Higher than 40% Higher than 50% 1.5
Between 10% and 40% Between 30% and 50% 1.0
Lower than 10% Lower than 30% 0.5
Generosity of social security schemes
Replacement rate social securityc Score
Higher than 50% 1.5
Between 30% and 50% 1.0
Lower than 30% 0.5
Sources:
a Natali (2004).
b European Commission (2003).
c Blondal and Scarpetta (1999).
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such pensions have been developed, the more these are available as
early retirement schemes and the higher the level of ﬂexibility is.
Finally, in all countries conditions for unemployment and disability
are relaxed for older workers, opening these routes as early retire-
ment pathways (Kohli et al., 1991). However, it is difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to assess country variation in the social security entitle-
ments for older workers both because of the great diversity of rules
that apply to them, and because the application of these rules is
often less strict in the case of older workers. The scores for the
various pillars are summed in order to obtain the overall ﬂexibility
and generosity scores for the early retirement system. Table 2 shows
the results of the index applied to the countries in our analysis. It
shows that ﬂexibility is the highest in Denmark and the lowest in
France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Generosity of the early retire-
ment system is the highest in the Netherlands and the lowest in
Ireland and the UK.
3.2 Empirical model
The dependent variable in our analysis is a binary indicator that
takes the value 1 if the individual was involved in formal training in
the past calendar year, and 0 otherwise. Because we only observe
Table 2. Country scores for ﬂexibility and











The Netherlands 1.5 3.0
Portugal 1.0 1.5
Spain 1.0 2.0
The UK 1.5 1.0
Source: Author’s own calculations using sources explained in
Table 1.
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selection problem is likely to exist when the employment decision is
not random. For example, when workers are a non-random sub-
sample of the population due to the fact that they share higher
abilities, estimation results are likely to be biased. To correct for
this possible selection bias, we apply a two-step Heckman selection
model (Heckman, 1976). In a ﬁrst step, we estimate a probit selec-
tion equation for participation in paid employment, and calculate
the non-selection term (inverted Mills ratio). In a second step, we
estimate a probit model for participation in training that includes
the non-selection term from the ﬁrst-step equation.
5 The model can
be written as follows:
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We are interested in the estimation of the likelihood of partici-
pating in training, y it 2 * , which is a function of X2it representing a
matrix of observed variables, and an unobserved error term e2i,
with i  1 ,...,N representing the individuals and t  1 ,...,T
representing time. However, y it 2 * is a latent variable and we only
observe a binary indicator y2it that takes the value of 1 if a person is
engaged in training at time point t, and 0 otherwise. Training is only
observed for people who are engaged in paid employment at time
point t, i.e. when y it 1 0 * > . This is also a latent variable, and a
function of X1it representing a matrix of observed variables and an
unobserved error term e1it. b1 and b2 are vectors of coefﬁcients to be
estimated. The non-selection term, lit, included in the second stage
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tion model and training. Identiﬁcation of the model is assured by
means of exclusion restrictions: the outcome equation includes job
characteristics that are absent in the selection model and the selec-
tion equation includes household characteristics that are absent in
the outcome equation but expected to account for self-selection into
employment. The model is estimated for all respondents (25–64
years old) on the pooled cross-sections.
6 In addition, a panel probit
model is estimated in order to control for unobserved characteris-
tics likely to affect training participation.
The selection equation for employment includes age, age
squared, gender, education as well as country and year dummies.
Education is measured as the highest educational level attained by
the individual according to the International Standard Classiﬁca-
tion of Education (ISCED). It is measured on a three-point scale
ranging from low (ISCED level 0–2) to high (ISCED level 5–7). For
identiﬁcation purposes, the model includes a number of variables
that are not included in the training equation: self-reported health
(on a three-point scale), household size, the employment status of
the partner (if any), and a dummy indicating any unemployment
spell in the past 5 years in the selection equation. The majority of
respondents have a partner, who is employed in about half of the
cases. In addition, the selection equation includes interaction terms
between the country dummies and age, age squared, gender, and
education. In so doing, the model explicitly accounts for the fact
that these characteristics have country-speciﬁc effects in the deci-
sion whether or not to work.
Covariates included in the probit equation for the participation
in training are derived from the theoretical framework exposed
above. Rather than imposing a quadratic form on the relation
between age and training, we included age categories (25–44, 45–54,
55–64) in the training participation model.
7 Although it is not our
main focus to test gender differences in training, we do include a
gender dummy in the training models. Education is accounted for,
as well as job characteristics. These include hours worked per week
(in log), sector of industry, ﬁrm size, tenure in the current job, a
dummy indicating whether or not the current job spell was preceded
by unemployment, a variable to account for the job level (e.g.
supervisory task or not). Overall work experience is not included in
the ECHP and therefore we only include job tenure in the current
job. It is available in a continuous trend up to 10 years or more and
we converted it into a dichotomous variable with six classes.
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indicator for sector of activity. On the one hand we distinguish
between the service sector and industry, and on the other hand
between the private and the public sector. Firm size is only available
but modelled only for workers in the private sector. Finally, the
model includes country and year dummies. In some models, the
country dummies are replaced with the country scores on generosity
and ﬂexibility of the early retirement system.
8 Table A1 in the
Appendix provides summary statistics of the covariates.
4. Country differences in the incidence of on-the-job training
4.1 Some descriptive evidence
Before turning to the estimation results, we ﬁrst discuss evidence
on the country differences in participation in on-the-job training in
our data. Figure 2 shows the percentages of workers receiving train-
ing by age groups and country. In all countries, the percentage of








































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECHP 1994–2001 pooled data, own calculations.
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previous studies (OECD, 1999). Riphahn and Trübswetter (2006)
hypothesized that if a population is ageing, one should observe a
behavioural adjustment leading to a relative increase in the training
incidence among older workers. This is veriﬁed in our data:
although older European workers were 40 per cent less likely to
receive training at the start of our observation period (1994), the
differential has fallen to 30 per cent by 2001. Figure 2 further shows
some interesting country differences. Scandinavian countries are
renowned for having an established tradition of lifelong learning
within ﬁrms and organizations, and for their policies of promoting
‘employability’ practice (Antikainen, 2001). One might argue that
the second phase distinguished in the life cycle model (employment
plus human capital investment) in these countries is relatively long.
This is conﬁrmed here as we ﬁnd the highest percentages of training
across all age groups in Denmark and Finland. Although the train-
ing incidence is the lowest for the oldest age group, still about half
of the older workforce participates in on-the-job training. An alter-
native explanation lies in the early retirement system of these coun-
tries. Both countries are characterized by moderately generous early
retirement schemes (Schils, 2005), which might be an incentive for
older workers to remain employed and to participate in training.
A second group of countries, comprising Austria, Belgium,
Ireland, and the UK, shows average participation rates in training
with about 15–20 per cent of older workers participating in job-
related training programmes. Interestingly, these countries are dif-
ferent when it comes to the generosity of early retirement schemes.
Early retirement is most generous in Austria and Belgium, but least
generous in Ireland and the UK. The relatively high participation in
training of older workers in the ﬁrst two countries might indicate
that these workers are a very select group. People who are still
employed at older ages in countries where early retirement is most
common and generous are expected to show a stronger labour
market attachment, either because of preferences or because of
ﬁnancial obligations. Overall, the lowest training participation rates
are found in Greece and Portugal. But the participation in training
of older workers (aged 55 and over) is also very low in other
countries, such as France and the Netherlands, where less than 5 per
cent of them are participating in formal training. These countries all
have moderately or highly generous early retirement schemes.
In his study, Pischke (2001) shows that high-educated workers
are more likely to receive training, but that when low-educated
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Although we have no information on training duration, we do
depict the incidence of training by educational level for younger and
older workers in Figure 3. It shows that the likelihood that one is
participating or has participated in on-the-job training in the past
year increases with the educational level. This supports the accu-
mulation perspective and is in line with previous studies (e.g.
Arulampalam et al., 2004; Brunello, 2001; OECD, 1999; Riphahn
and Trübswetter, 2008). Moreover, this pattern appears to be
similar across age groups, albeit at different levels. In three coun-
tries, Denmark, Finland, and the UK, once we control for educa-
tion, the differences in training incidence across age groups are
small. In the other countries, however, at each educational level,
workers aged 55–64 are signiﬁcantly less likely to participate in
training than younger workers. It seems, however, that the differ-
ence in training incidence across age groups is smaller for the low
educated than for the other educational levels. The estimation
results will reveal whether these differences are signiﬁcant when
controlling for other covariates and for self-selection into paid
employment.
Figure 3. Training participation of workers in Europe, by age,
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Source: ECHP 1994–2001 pooled data, own calculations.
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The results from the probit models for the likelihood of partici-
pating in training are reported in Table 3.
9 Model 1 refers to the
model without control for the selection bias, whereas the other
models do include the inverted Mills ratio correcting for such selec-
tion bias. This inverted Mills ratio reﬂects the correlation between
the unobserved error terms in the selection and the outcome equa-
tion.Itishighlysigniﬁcantandnegative,suggestingthatunobserved
characteristics (i.e. incorporated into the error term) that increase
people’s employment probability are negatively correlated to train-
ing. Models 2 and 3 are estimated using the country dummies, with
Model 3 including interaction terms between age and education
level. Models 4 and 5 use the generosity and ﬂexibility scores for the
early retirement institutions rather than the country dummies, with
Model 5 including interaction terms between age and these features
of early retirement systems. Model 6, ﬁnally, is a random-effects
panelprobitregressionthatisestimatedtoexploitthepanelnatureof
the data and to assess the robustness of the results once the estima-
tions also account for unobserved characteristics that affect the
likelihood of participating in training.
Table 3 shows that older workers are indeed less likely to partici-
pate in training than younger workers; according to the marginal
effects workers aged between 45 and 54 participate on average 3.2
per cent less in training and workers aged over 55 on average 5 per
cent. Although signiﬁcant, these effects are smaller than the above
descriptive statistics suggest. This is mostly due to the fact that the
model explicitly accounts for self-selection in paid employment. A
simple probit model that does not correct for selection into paid
employment (Model 1) overestimates the effect of age; after self-
selection in paid employment is accounted for (Model 2), the mar-
ginal effects fall with 1.0 and 3.3 percentage points for workers aged
45–54 and 55–64, respectively.
Even when controlling for self-selection into employment and
other covariates, the accumulation perspective on human capital is
supported: having a high education level increases the probability
of being engaged in training, whereas having a low education level
reduces it. Job level shows similar results. The model with interac-
tion between education and age (Model 3), however, shows that this
complementarity especially holds for workers younger than 45. For
workers aged over 45, having a high educational level as opposed to
an average educational level does not signiﬁcantly affect the
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ability at older age, however, is more in favour of the low educated.
This suggests that at older ages training is used to compensate for
low human capital. This is in line with the results of Riphahn and
Trübswetter (2008) who conclude that the relevance of formal edu-
cation appears only of importance for younger workers. Moreover,
the results for tenure are similar, showing that training participa-
tion is the highest among workers with a short tenure.
We ﬁnd that women have a higher probability of being engaged
in training than men. This supports the idea put forward by
Arulampalam et al. (2004) that women are in higher need of train-
ing because they change jobs more frequently or because they
have temporarily dropped out of the labour market due to care
obligations.
10 Note that when replacing the country dummies by the
early retirement indicators, the effect of female increases in size.
This is explained by the fact that the country dummies include some
unobserved explanatory factors that explain part of the female
effect on training participation. One can think of cultural differ-
ences that can affect the training participation of women.
The country dummies support the descriptive ﬁndings discussed
before.Aftercontrollingfortheindividualandjobcharacteristicsof
the workers, training participation is the highest in Denmark and
Finland, and it is the lowest in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Portugal. Replacing the country dummies by the
indicatorsofthecountry’searlyretirementsystemrevealsinteresting
results. The index for ﬂexibility of the early retirement regime shows
a positive effect on training participation, especially for workers
aged between 45 and 54. Apparently, ﬂexibility of early retirement
arrangements and lifelong learning are positively correlated. To be
more speciﬁc, in countries where workers have a larger opportunity
set with respect to the age at which to retire, older workers have a
higher probability of participating in training. One might argue that
both the older worker and the employer are willing to invest in
training, as the exit moment is not necessarily close by. Note that
ﬂexibility and training participation is the highest in Denmark. We
have therefore repeated the analysis excluding this country but have
found the same result. In addition, the generosity of the early retire-
ment route has a negative effect on the training probability of older
workers, with the effect being the strongest for the oldest age group.
As expected and shown in other studies as well, the generosity of
early retirement schemes is a strong incentive for pulling older
workersoutofthelabourmarket(e.g.Schils,2008).Thisreducesthe
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worker’s side. A random-effects probit model that accounts for the
panel structure of our data conﬁrms the above results.
A question that remains after these analyses is whether training
older workers can keep them longer in the labour market. To get a
ﬁrst impression of this, Table 4 shows the yearly labour market exit
rate of older workers between t and t + 1, depending on whether or
not they have followed any training in the previous year (t - 1). The
computation only applies to workers who have not yet reached
the ofﬁcial retirement age. The country differences in the effect of
training for the labour market exit rate of older workers are large.
The difference in exit probabilities between older workers with
and without training is largest in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and
Denmark. Small differences or almost no differences are found in
Spain, the UK, Ireland, and Greece. These descriptive statistics
suggest that training is beneﬁcial to the labour force participation of
older workers in some countries more than in others. However, we
suspectthatthefactorsaffectingtheworker’sdecisiontoparticipate
in training also affect the exit decision (e.g. age). Consequently, we
expect the training outcomes not to be independent of the observed
exitoutcome.Inotherwords,workersareexpectedtoself-selectinto
training: older workers who expect to continue working are more
likely to participate in training than workers who expect to retire
Table 4. Percentage of older workers who exit
paid employment between t and t + 1i n
relation to training participation in t - 1
No Yes Difference
Austria 24.1 14.6 -9.5
Belgium 22.6 10.1 -12.5
Denmark 17.5 10.7 -6.8
Finland 18.1 14.0 -4.1
France 20.5 14.4 -6.1
Germany 19.7 8.9 -10.8
Greece 20.1 21.4 1.3
Ireland 11.9 12.4 0.5
Italy 19.2 9.0 -10.2
The Netherlands 14.2 5.3 -8.9
Portugal 13.8 7.8 -6.0
Spain 17.5 17.3 -0.2
The UK 13.5 13.8 0.3
Source: ECHP 1994–2001 pooled data, own calculations.
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endogenousregressorintheearlyretirementdecision,whichneedsto
be treated adequately in empirical analyses. This goes beyond the
scope of this study and is left for future scrutiny.
5. Conclusion
The standard prediction from human capital theory is that older
workers are less likely to be involved in on-the-job training than
younger workers. This is because of the expected lower net returns
of such investments, both to the worker and to the ﬁrm. However,
because the population is ageing in Europe, it is becoming increas-
ingly important to invest in the employability of the older work-
force. In the recent past, governments have shown more interest for
reforming the pension systems and removing ﬁnancial incentives to
early retirement. But this might just not be enough to keep the older
workers in employment; additional measures aiming at increasing
the skills of the older workforce could be necessary. In this paper,
we investigated to what extent older workers in Europe receive
on-the-job training. We have done this using data from the ECHP.
The main contribution of the paper is that we investigate to what
extent older workers’ investments in training depend on the ﬂexi-
bility and generosity of the early retirement schemes of the country
in which they live.
We have shown that older workers do indeed participate less in
training than younger workers. The probability that workers aged
55–64 participate in training is 5 percentage points lower than that
for younger workers aged between 25 and 44. For workers aged
between 45 and 54, the probability is 3.2 percentage points lower.
Wefurtherﬁndthattrainingparticipationandformaleducationare
complementary, i.e. the likelihood of following training increases
with education level. However, this complementarity only holds for
younger workers (aged below 45). For older workers it appears to
be the case that especially those with a low education level are more
likely to follow training: they seem to engage in a compen-
sating strategy whereby training makes up for their lack of formal
education.
The observed differential in training incidence between older and
younger workers is signiﬁcantly smaller in countries with a
well-established tradition of lifelong learning, such as Denmark and
Finland. These countries are also characterized as having a more
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choice as to the age at which to retire, yet with rather modest
replacement incomes. It therefore seems that in such systems, the
older worker and the employer are more willing to invest in training
because they expect larger returns. In other early retirement systems
that are characterized as more generous (they offer higher replace-
ment rates), the probability that an older worker participates in
training is lower (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands). Descriptive evi-
dence suggests that investing in training promotes the participation
of older workers in paid employment, although this effect is differ-
ent across countries. With a view on an ageing workforce, the
evidence presented here suggests that there are employability gains
to training older workers.
Appendix
Table A1. Summary statistics on covariates (in percentages, unless
otherwise mentioned)
Covariate Selection equation Training equation
Aged 25–44/45–54/55–64 55.59/24.05/20.35 65.67/25.34/8.99
Female 54.09 42.94
Low/average/high education level 42.58/34.06/21.88 31.52/38.21/28.96
Education level missing 1.49 1.31
Bad/fair/good/missing health 8.25/23.66/67.50/0.60





Any unemployment spell in past 5
years
22.46














Tenure < 1 year/1–4 years/5–9 years 9.16/26.83/17.81
Tenure 10–14 years/15+ years/missing 11.37/29.64/5.20
Unemployed before current job 21.70
Note:
a Not available for Germany.
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1 This relationship holds for both men and women.
2 Causality can run both ways here. A lack of training might induce early
retirement, yet the mere existence of early retirement might reduce participation in
training.
3 The data are provided by Eurostat and used with their permission. However,
the data provider bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations pre-
sented in this study. Sweden is excluded because the data are cross-sections.
Because of its small sample size and missing relevant variables, Luxembourg is also
dropped. For the UK and Germany, the ECHP contains two sources of informa-
tion: ECHP-speciﬁc panel data and panel data from the national panels (The
British Household Panel Study and the German Socio-Economic Panel). For these
two countries, we use the latter source. For Austria data are available from 1995,
and for Finland the data start in 1996.
4 The question is missing in the Netherlands for 1994.
5 A joint maximum likelihood estimation of the two equations as in van de Ven
and van Praag (1981) gave the same results.
6 When the model is estimated on the pooled cross-sections the assumption of
independent observations is violated. This results in a downward bias of the
variance of the parameters, which is corrected by using the Huber/White sandwich
estimator of variance (Huber, 1967; White, 1980).
7 Women aged 60 or over are excluded in the case of the UK because they have
reached the ofﬁcial pension age.
Table A2. Model estimates of the probit model for the likelihood of
being employed
Covariate Marginal effect Standard error
Age 0.103** 0.005
Age squared (*0.01) -0.134** 0.005
Education level (reference: average)
Low educated -0.177** 0.017
High educated 0.072** 0.015
Female -0.138** 0.014
Household size -0.044** 0.001
Partner, if any (reference: employed)
Unemployed -0.042** 0.006
Inactive 0.007 0.004
Health status (reference: fair health)
Bad health -0.225** 0.005
Good health 0.085** 0.003
Any unemployment spell in the past 5 years -0.151** 0.004
Notes:* * P < 0.01. Pseudo R-squared is 0.300, Chi-square is 42,862.773, degrees of freedom
are 90, number of observations in the person-period ﬁle 541,008. The model also
includes country dummies, year dummies, and interactions between country and age,
country and age squared, country and gender, and country and education.
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© 2009 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.8 Also in this case the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance is applied
because of the clustering of the generosity and ﬂexibility scores at the country level.
9 Only relevant variables are discussed here; full estimation results are available
upon request. Our results compare well with other studies on training incidence
in Europe (Arulampalam et al., 2004; Bassanini et al., 2005). The results for the
selection model are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
10 Despite the fact that the ECHP does not contain information on the entire
work history, looking at current job durations we ﬁnd that these are indeed shorter
for older women (aged over 45) compared with men of the same age. For example,
about 71 per cent of older male workers have been employed for more than 10
years in the current job compared with only 61 per cent of older female workers.
This leads us to suspect that women indeed experience more job changes and
discontinuous working careers.
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